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As reimbursement rates decline or remain stagnant, an 
increasing number of physicians are acquiring ownership interests 
in freestanding health care facilities, such as ambulatory surgical 
centers (ASCs), sleep disorder centers, and single-specialty 
hospitals, including long-term acute care and rehabilitation 
hospitals.  These outpatient, freestanding facilities provide a means 
for physicians to increase their earnings by sharing in the profits of 
health care while also directly controlling the quality of care 
delivered to their patients.  Among other things, ownership and 
joint ventures enable physicians to bill both for the professional 
component and facility fee component of services rendered, 
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increasing physician revenue opportunities. 
The relationship between a hospital and its medical staff is 
symbiotic.  Physicians and hospitals have struggled to provide 
services as the cost of providing health care has soared, 
reimbursement has decreased, and health care is delivered in a 
highly regulated environment.  As physicians increasingly invest in 
freestanding outpatient facilities, hospitals are questioning the 
impact of this competition upon hospital revenue and the patient 
base. 
The growth in specialty hospitals and other freestanding 
facilities has been controversial.  In October 2003, the United 
States General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report to 
Congress entitled “Specialty Hospitals: Geographic Location, 
Services Provided, and Financial Performance.”1  In this report, the 
GAO found that seventy percent of the specialty hospitals it 
reviewed had some degree of physician ownership.2  The GAO 
noted that “21 out of 25 specialty hospitals treated a lower 
percentage of patients who were severely ill compared with patients 
in the same diagnosis categories treated at general hospitals in the 
same urban areas.”3  The report also concluded that specialty 
hospitals treated a smaller percentage of Medicaid patients than 
general hospitals.4  These patients account for some of the lowest 
levels of reimbursement. 
Physician investment in specialty hospitals and other 
freestanding healthcare providers has led many tertiary hospitals to 
claim that the physicians owning freestanding healthcare facilities 
are “cherry picking” the patients with less severe medical problems 
and better insurance coverage, leaving the hospitals to contend 
with the sicker patients with higher acuities who have Medicaid or 
are uninsured.5  Not-for-profit and community hospitals usually do 
not have the ability or desire to turn away patients based upon 
ability to pay.  Hospitals argue that physicians who invest in 
freestanding facilities are diverting from the hospitals certain 
procedures with higher reimbursement rates and lower costs, 
 
 1. GAO-04-167 (Oct., 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d04167.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 9. 
 3. Id. at 7-8. 
 4. Id. at 4. 
 5. FED. TRADE COMM’N & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE 
OF COMPETITION, 20-21 (July 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
healthcare/040723healthcarept.pdf. 
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which in turn affects the ability of the hospitals to provide 
emergency care and other essential services needed by the local 
community.6 
The response by hospitals to the growth of ASCs and single-
specialty hospitals has been multi-fold.  With hospital industry 
backing, Congress included in last year’s Medicare Prescription 
Drug legislation an eighteen month moratorium prohibiting a 
physician from referring a patient to cardiac, orthopedic, or 
surgical specialty hospitals in which the physician had an ownership 
or investment interest.7  Hospitals have initiated or participated in 
mutually beneficial partnerships or joint ventures with physicians, 
within the limits set by the fraud and abuse regulations and the 
restrictions imposed on tax-exempt institutions, to encourage 
physicians to invest with the hospital instead of with potentially 
competing freestanding facilities.8  Hospitals have also used their 
market power to enter into exclusive contracts with payors to freeze 
out specialty hospitals and/or ASCs from provider lists.9 
Hospitals have also responded to this perceived economic 
threat by injecting economic factors into the credentialing process 
and the grant of medical staff privileges to physicians.10  These 
hospitals are electing to impose penalties, including the loss of 
medical staff privileges, upon physicians whose conduct is deemed 
by the hospital administrators and governing bodies to be disloyal 
or otherwise in conflict with the economic interests of the 
hospitals.11 
Such “conflicts credentialing” occurs when a hospital considers 
a physician’s relationship with other hospitals or freestanding 
entities that compete with the hospital to which the physician is 
seeking or maintaining medical staff privileges.12  Through conflicts 
 
 6. Id. at 21-22. 
 7. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 507, 117 Stat. 2066, 2295-97. 
 8. HEALTH LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 32:2 (West, 2004). 
 9. See, e.g., Rome Ambulatory Surgical Ctr., LLC v. Rome Mem’l Hosp., No. 
5:01-CV-23, at 4-5 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2004); supra note 5, at 23. 
 10. See, e.g., AM. MED. ASSOC., ORGANIZED MED. STAFF SECTION, ECONOMIC 
CREDENTIALING, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/bup/category 
/10303.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005); Judith E. Orie, Comment, Economic 
Credentialing: BottomLine Medical Care, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1998). 
 11. See infra Part II (discussing cases where hospitals have attempted to deny 
or rescind staff privileges based on economic or conflict criteria). 
 12. Robert J. Milligan & Michelle Notrica, Plata o Plomo: Hospital Medical Staff 
Relations in the Era of Conflicts Credentialing, 2 HEALTH LAWYERS WEEKLY 35, Sept. 3, 
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credentialing, hospitals seek to deny, rescind, or hinder the staff 
privileges of physicians who invest in freestanding facilities that 
hospitals perceive as competing for patients and revenues in the 
relevant health care market. 
The emerging practice of conflicts credentialing represents a 
significant change in the economic and professional interests of 
physicians and in the relationship between medical staffs and 
hospitals.  In this article, the authors explain the interrelationship 
between the authority of hospitals and medical staffs to manage 
their respective affairs and the legal developments that have led 
toward conflicts credentialing.13  The authors next discuss the 
medical community’s reaction to conflicts credentialing and the 
legal challenges facing the use of economic factors in physician 
credentialing.14 
I. MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING 
Hospital medical staff privileges were typically granted to 
physicians who were able to provide quality patient care and meet 
all of the requisite education and licensure requirements.  The 
traditional perception was that training, experience, and general 
practice were of primary importance in the credentialing process, 
and hospital staff privileges were granted to physicians who 
provided quality patient care.15  Credentialing decisions were 
historically based on quality considerations and a determination of 
the applicant physician’s current clinical competence, for example, 
appropriate medical training, unrestricted state licensure, medical 
liability coverage, and an unrestricted federal DEA number.16  The 
physician requesting privileges demonstrated the appropriate 
education, training, experience, and expertise to exercise those 
privileges.17 
In addition, physicians have maintained memberships on 
multiple medical staffs to (1) treat patients at the facility offering 
the best care and (2) accommodate cross coverage of patients.18  
 
2004, available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlw/issues/040903/print.cfm. 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See infra Part III-IV. 
 15. See Letter from Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., American Medical Association, to 
Ms. June Gibbs Brown, Office of Inspector General, Department of Health and 
Human Services (Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with author). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss3/8
8MARKSMATCHINSKI.DOC 3/13/2005  4:12:27 PM 
2005] CONFLICTS CREDENTIALING 1013 
Hospitals have also been traditionally open to permitting qualified 
local physicians to enjoy medical staff privileges at other hospitals; 
tax exempt hospitals are generally required to maintain an “open 
medical staff.”19 
Medical staff credentialing is governed by state laws,20 the 
Medicare Conditions of Participation,21 and the accreditation 
standards implemented by the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO).22  When hospitals, through 
their medical staffs, utilize this approach, economic considerations 
do not factor into the hospital’s credentialing process and 
decisions.  Physicians who are members of a hospital’s medical staff 
usually are required by the hospital’s medical staff rules and 
regulations, as a condition of their continued medical staff 
membership, to serve on various hospital committees which may 
include credentialing, bylaws, and institutional review board 
committees that perform peer review and act primarily for the 
benefit of the hospital.23 
The use of economic criteria by the hospital as part of the 
credentialing process is a break from this traditional view and 
reflects the financial pressures now facing both hospitals and 
physicians.  With economic credentialing, the hospital, either 
directly or by amending the medical staff bylaws to include a 
“conflicts policy,” interjects economic criteria into the decision to 
grant or permit a physician to maintain staff privileges.24  The 
hospital provides the physician with a conflict of interest statement 
or other questionnaires addressing the nature of the physician’s 
relationship with other hospitals or health care entities.25  This 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id.  For example, Illinois law states that “all hospitals licensed under this 
Act (Illinois Hospital Licensing Act), except county hospitals as defined in 
subsection (c) of Section 15-1 of the Illinois Public Aid Code, shall comply with, 
and the medical staff bylaws of these hospitals shall include rules consistent with, 
the provisions of this Section in granting, limiting, renewing, or denying medical 
staff membership and clinical staff privileges.” 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/10.4(b) 
(2004). 
 21. 42 C.F.R. § 482.12(a)(5) (2005). 
 22. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
Standards (JCAHO), MS 4.10-4.40 (2004), at http://www.jcaho.org/htba/ 
hospitals/facts.htm. 
 23. Id. 
 24. American Medical Association, Economic Credentialing, (explaining the 
American Medical Association Policy H-230.975), at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/10303.html (last visited February 8, 2005). 
 25. See, e.g., Complaint ¶5, Murphy v. Baptist Health, (13th Div. Civ. Ct. Ark. 
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inquiry by the hospital may occur as part of the credentialing 
process at the time the physician applies or reapplies for privileges, 
or at any time that the physician is a member of the hospital’s 
medical staff.26 
The hospital’s governing body reviews the physician’s 
responses to the hospital’s written questions to determine if the 
physician has a financial interest in a health care facility that 
conflicts with the hospital.27  If a perceived financial conflict exists, 
the hospital may deny the physician medical staff privileges or 
remove the physician from the hospital’s medical staff if the 
physician is an active medical staff member.28  Appeal rights are 
often curtailed or non-existent.29 
II. THE EMERGING TREND FROM MEDICAL QUALIFICATIONS TO 
ECONOMIC AND CONFLICTS CREDENTIALING 
The advent of exclusive provider contracts between hospitals 
and physicians signaled a departure from the use of medical 
criteria to determine a physician’s clinical competence and 
certification for staff privileges.  Exclusive provider contracts arise 
when a hospital contracts with an outside physician or physician 
group to exclusively use certain hospital facilities, such as radiology 
or emergency room units.  Physicians who are not parties to the 
exclusive provider contracts are denied privileges or their existing 
privileges are limited or revoked to perform the medical services 
that are being exclusively performed by physicians or the group 
practice that entered into these contracts. 
Physicians who were adversely affected by such contracts, and 
denied or excluded from medical staff privileges as a result, 
challenged the exclusive agreements as unreasonable restraints of 
trade and on other theories.  In most states, the courts found that 
granting exclusive contracts was a legitimate exercise of a hospital’s 
inherent right to conduct its independent business affairs and that 
staff medical privileges were not an entitlement.30  Many courts, as 
 
filed Feb. 24, 2004)  (No. CV2004-2002). 
 26. See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint ¶ 82, Med. Staff of Cmty. Mem’l 
Hosp. of San Buenaventura v. Cmty. Mem’l Hosp. of San Buenaventura (Cal. 
Super. Ct. 2003) (No. CIV 219107). 
 27. Id. 
 28. American Medical Association, supra note 24. 
 29. See Complaint ¶ 7, Murphy (No. CV2004-2002). 
 30. See Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., No. 95-2549, 1996 WL 498095, at *1 
(4th Cir. N.C. Sept. 4, 1996) (per curiam); Drs. Steuer & Latham, P.A. v. Nat’l 
6
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well as the Federal Trade Commission, have concluded that 
exclusive contracts foster competition and enhance the delivery of 
health care, outweighing the anti-competitive and exclusionary 
aspects of the contracts on physicians who were denied staff 
privileges.31 
There is no uniform definition of economic credentialing.  
The American Medical Association (AMA) defines economic 
credentialing as “the use of economic criteria unrelated to quality 
of care or professional competence in determining a physician’s 
qualifications for initial or continuing hospital medical staff 
membership or privileges.”32  The term embodies a complete and 
diverse set of practices that affect the staffing privileges of 
physicians on economic grounds.  As one expert explained: 
Increasingly, physicians are evaluated on criteria such as: 
number of patients treated, time allotted to each patient, 
amount of insurance reimbursement received, number of 
referrals and consultations, medication costs, liability 
claims, patient satisfaction surveys, and other similar 
economic factors.  The terms “economic efficiency” and 
“cost containment,” frequently touted by hospitals, are 
merely euphemisms for economic credentialing.33 
The term “conflicts credentialing” is a new and more targeted 
form of economic credentialing.  It is not to be confused with a 
“conflicts of interest” which precludes a partner or a corporate 
officer from competing with the partnership or corporation.  
Absent express medical staff bylaws to the contrary, physicians are 
not agents of the hospital and hospitals generally resist the 
suggestion or argument that physicians are agents of the hospital.34  
Rather, the concept of conflicts credentialing rests with those cases 
 
Med. Enter., No. 87-3753, 1988 WL 46286, at *1 (4th Cir. May 10, 1988) (per 
curiam); Redding v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 255 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); 
Garibaldi v. Applebaum, 742 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. 2001); Dutta v. St. Francis Reg’l Med. 
Ctr., 867 P.2d 1057 (Kan. 1994); Bartley v. E. Maine Med. Ctr., 617 A.2d 1020 (Me. 
1992) (holding notice and hearing provisions not triggered by policy requiring 
exclusive contracts); Vakil v. Anesthesiology Assoc. of Taunton, 744 N.E.2d 651 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2001); Van Valkenburg v. Paracelsus Healthcare Corp., 606 
N.W.2d 908 (N.D. 2000); Tenent Health Ltd. v. Zamora, 13 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 31. In re Burnham Hosp., 101 FED. TRADE COMMISSION 991 (1983). 
 32. American Medical Association, supra note 24. 
 33. Judith E. Orie, M.D., Economic Credentialing; Bottom Line Medical Care, 36 
DUQ. L. REV. 437, 437-38 (1998). 
 34. See Haven v. Randolph, 342 F. Supp. 538, 542 (D.D.C. 1972); Espalin v. 
Children’s Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 27 S.W.3d 675, 683-84 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
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recognizing the right of a hospital’s board to exercise its business 
judgment to run the business affairs of the hospital. 
Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s35 is one of the leading cases on the 
topic of conflicts credentialing.  In that case, the South Dakota 
Supreme Court recognized the right of the hospital to use 
economic criteria and potential conflicts to make credentialing 
decisions without looking at a physician’s medical credentials or 
abilities.36 
Avera St. Lukes (ASL) was a private, nonprofit hospital in 
Aberdeen, South Dakota.37  A group of orthopedic surgeons 
formed Orthopedic Surgery Specialists (OSS) and built a day 
surgery center to compete with ASL.38  In the first seven months of 
OSS operation, “ASL suffered a 1000 hour loss of operating room 
usage.”39 
In response, ASL’s Board of Trustees (the Board) passed two 
resolutions: one “clos[ing] ASL’s medical staff with respect to 
physicians requesting privileges” to perform certain spinal 
procedures and the second “clos[ing] the medical staff to 
applicants for orthopedic privileges except for two general 
orthopedic surgeons being recruited by ASL.”40  In passing these 
resolutions, the Board “specifically determined that the staff 
closures were in the best interests of the Aberdeen community and 
the surrounding area.”41  The closure did not affect the physicians 
who had already been granted staff privileges.42 
Mahan was an orthopedic surgeon recruited by OSS.43  Mahan 
applied for staff privileges at ASL after he began practicing at 
OSS.44  ASL denied Mahan’s request for privileges; subsequently 
OSS and Mahan brought suit for breach of the medical staff 
bylaws.45 
The trial court reasoned that “the Board had delegated . . . 
authority concerning staff privileges to the medical staff,” and 
therefore “no longer had the power to initiate actions that affected 
 
 35. 2001 SD 9, 621 N.W. 2d 150 (S.D. 2001). 
 36. Id. ¶ 32, 621 N.W.2d at 160. 
 37. Id. ¶ 2, 621 N.W.2d at 152. 
 38. Id. ¶ 5, 621 N.W.2d at 153. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. ¶ 6, 621 N.W.2d at 153. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. ¶ 7, 621 N.W.2d at 153. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. ¶¶ 7-8, 621 N.W.2d at 153. 
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the privileges of the medical staff.”46  The trial court found that “the 
Board had breached its contract with the medical staff” when it 
unilaterally closed staff privileges.47  The South Dakota Supreme 
Court reversed.48 
The South Dakota Supreme Court reaffirmed that the bylaws 
were an enforceable contract between the hospital and physicians,49 
but disagreed with the trial court’s determination of the language 
and effect of that contract.50  The court reasoned that pursuant to 
South Dakota law, “‘the affairs of a [non-profit] corporation shall 
be managed by a board of directors,’”51 and that a hospital was 
required to “have ‘a medical staff organized under bylaws and rules 
approved by the governing body and responsible to the governing body 
of the hospital for the quality of all medical care provided patients in 
the hospital and for the ethical and professional practices of its 
members.’”52  “[D]irectors ‘possess a large amount of discretionary 
power within the limits of their legal authority, and in the exercise 
of business judgment in the performance of their duties.’”53  In 
reversing the decision of the trial court, the court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ argument that medical staff bylaws superseded the 
Corporate Bylaws.54  Rather, the court reasoned that the medical 
staff’s powers were derivative of the powers of the Board, and that 
the medical staff bylaws “must originate from, and be authorized 
by, the Board pursuant to the Corporate Bylaws.”55  The Corporate 
Bylaws specifically provided that “‘the business and the property of 
the Corporation shall be managed and controlled, . . . by a Board 
of Trustees’” and that “‘all the corporate powers . . . except such as 
are otherwise provided for in these By Laws [sic] . . . shall be vested 
in and shall be exercised by the Members of the Board of 
Trustees.’”56  Therefore, the court concluded that “the medical staff 
has no authority over any corporate decisions unless specifically 
 
 46. Id. ¶ 8, 621 N.W.2d at 153. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. ¶ 35, 621 N.W.2d at 161. 
 49. Id. ¶ 10, 621 N.W.2d at 153-54. 
 50. See id. ¶¶ 31-32, 621 N.W.2d at 150. 
 51. Id. ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d at 154 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-23-13 
(1989)) (alteration and emphasis in original). 
 52. Id. (quoting S.D. ADMIN. R. 44:04:04:02.01 (1995)) (emphasis in original). 
 53. Id. (quoting 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1486 (2004)). 
 54. Id. ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d at 154-55. 
 55. Id. ¶ 17, 621 N.W.2d at 155. 
 56. Id. (quoting ST. LUKE’S MIDLAND REGIONAL MED. CENTER, CORPORATE 
BYLAWS). 
9
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granted that power in the Corporate Bylaws”57 or by statute,58 and 
the Board had the “authority to make business decisions without 
first consulting the medical staff.”59 
As the court noted, in closing staff privileges the Board had 
specifically found that “the staff closures were in the Aberdeen 
community’s best interests” and were necessary to preserve 
profitable services at ASL.60  The court reasoned that “[b]y 
preserving the profitable neurological services at ASL, the Board 
also insured that other unprofitable services would continue to be 
offered in the Aberdeen area.”61  Therefore, the decision to close 
the medical staff was within the discretion of the Board exercising 
its business judgment.62  “[T]he courts should not interfere in the 
internal politics and decision making of a private, nonprofit 
hospital corporation when those decisions are made pursuant to its 
Corporate Bylaws.”63 
Notably, Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s does not stand for the 
proposition that the Board can indiscriminately interfere with or 
impose credentialing decisions on economic grounds.  The ASL 
Board’s authority was grounded in the actual language of ASL’s 
Corporate Bylaws and by state law.  Further, the Board’s actions 
only impacted future credentialing decisions.  As such, the court 
found little to distinguish the case before it with those decisions 
upholding the authority of a hospital to enter into exclusive 
provider contracts without the prior permission of the medical 
staff.64  The case did not address the authority of the Board to 
terminate existing staff privileges or impose conflicts credentialing 
on a retroactive basis. 
The case of Medical Staff of Community Memorial Hospital of San 
Buenaventura v. Community Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura65 
illustrates the limits of a board’s authority when it unilaterally 
 
 57. Id. ¶ 18, 621 N.W.2d at 155 (emphasis in original). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. ¶ 19, 621 N.W.2d at 156. 
 60. Id. ¶ 6, 621 N.W.2d at 153. 
 61. Id. ¶ 20, 621 N.W.2d at 156. 
 62. Id. ¶ 16, 621 N.W.2d at 154. 
 63. Id. ¶ 20, 621 N.W.2d at 156. 
 64. Id. ¶ 26, 621 N.W.2d at 158. 
 65. No. CIV 219107 (Ventura County, Cal. Super. Ct.) (on file with author); 
see AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, A Victory for Physicians, at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13815.html (Aug. 23, 2004); see also Plaintiff’s 
Second Amended Complaint, San Buenaventura (No. CIV 219107) (on file with 
author). 
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attempts to alter the medical staff bylaws and retroactively remove 
the staff privileges of physicians.  In Medical Staff of Community 
Memorial Hospital of San Buenaventura, the hospital sought to 
unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws to, among other things, 
establish a conflict of interest policy that required physicians to sign 
a conflict of interest statement that purported to make staff 
members ineligible for holding office if they had an ownership 
interest in any entity engaged in a business that competed with the 
hospital.66  The medical staff sued for breach of contract, claiming 
that the amendments violated the medical staff bylaws, California 
law, and constituted an unlawful interference with the role of the 
medical staff in credentialing staff members.67 
The hospital moved to dismiss on the grounds that the 
medical staff, as an unincorporated association, did not have 
standing to sue the governing body of the hospital.68  The court 
found that the medical staff had standing to bring the action on 
behalf of the entire medical staff, but not the individual members.69  
The parties eventually settled after the medical director resigned, 
with the hospital agreeing, among other things, that the medical 
staff bylaws could not be amended or changed unilaterally by the 
hospital administrator.70 
III. STATE AND MEDICAL ASSOCIATION RESPONSES TO CONFLICTS 
CREDENTIALING 
Twenty states have enacted legislation addressing whether and 
how a hospital can consider economic factors in the credentialing 
process.  The content and the potential protection afforded 
physicians by these statutes vary.  Ten states permit hospitals to use 
economic criteria in credentialing;71 whereas, ten other states and 
the District of Columbia restrict hospitals from using economic 
factors in credentialing decisions.72 
 
 66. San Buenaventura, No. CIV 219107. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0191 (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 
31-7-7 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-21-2-5 (1996 & West Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE § 
135B.7 (2001 & Supp. 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-431 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., 
HEALTH-GEN. § 19-319 (1982 & Michie Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-85 
(2002); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2801-b (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2005). 
 72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14087.28 (2002 & West Supp. 2005); COLO. 
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The practice of conflicts credentialing has divided the medical 
profession.  The AMA and the American College of Medical 
Quality (ACMQ) have both issued position statements opposing 
the practice.  “The AMA opposes the use of economic criteria not 
related to quality to determine an individual physician’s 
qualifications. . . .”73  The ACQM has declared that “[c]redentialing 
[practices] must be the exclusive product of qualified and objective 
peer review, utilizing criteria directly related to the quality of 
patient care in which neither over nor under-utilization of medical 
resources is accepted.”74  Conversely, the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) asserts that hospitals must be allowed to 
establish policies necessary to protect the hospitals economic 
interests.75 
Because JCAHO standards address the organization and 
governance of the medical staff, they shape institutional 
procedures related to credentialing.76  The current JCAHO 
standards anticipate medical staff self-governance which can be 
implemented by the adoption of bylaws and rules regulating 
medical staff activities.77  Importantly, the standards allow neither 
the medical staff nor the governing board to unilaterally amend the 
bylaws.78  However, hospital and other medical facility interests have 
 
REV. STAT. § 25-3-103.7 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 44-507 (2004); IDAHO CODE § 41-
3920 (Michie 2003); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 85/2(b) (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
37:1301 (1999 & West Supp. 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 51C (2003); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 23-17-52 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-205, §68-11-227 (2001 & 
Supp. 2004); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 241.1015 (1999 & Vernon Supp. 
2004-2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-134.1 (2004).  
 73. American Medical Association, Policy H-230.976 Economic Credentialing, 
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=resultLink& 
doc=policyfiles/HnE/H-230.976.HTM&s_t=H-230.976&catg=AMA/HnE&catg= 
AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=1& (last visited Feb. 8, 
2005). 
 74. American College of Medical Quality, Policy 19 Economic Credentialing 
(adopted Nov. 13, 1997), available at http://www.acmq.org/profess/policy19.htm. 
 75. Letter from Rick Pollack, Executive Vice President, American Hospital 
Association to The Honorable Janet Rehnquist, Office of Inspector General, 
available at http://www.aha.org/aha/advocacy-grassroots/advocacy/comment/ 
2003/cl030205credential.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
 76. See Judith J. Semo, Hospital-Medical Staff Relations: Strengthening Fragile 
Relationships, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ANESTHESIOLOGISTS NEWSLETTER, Dec. 2003, 
available at http://www.asahq.org/newsletters/2003/12-03/semo.html. 
 77. JCAHO STANDARDS, MS 2.1, at http://www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/ 
perspectives.asp?durki=2837 &site=10&return=6063#d (effective date Jan. 7, 2002) 
(“Medical staff bylaws and rules and regulations are adopted by the medical staff 
and approved by the governing body before becoming effective.”). 
 78. Id. (“Neither body may unilaterally amend the medical staff bylaws or 
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recently begun to lobby JCAHO, arguing that facility boards should 
have “absolute control over medical staff composition and 
function.”79  The ability to unilaterally amend medical staff bylaws 
would follow from such increased control.80  Despite the lobbying 
effort, JCAHO recently proposed a rule that would authorize a 
citation of noncompliance where bylaws permitted unilateral 
amendment.81  If it is adopted, the JCAHO rule would be 
retroactive to 2004.82 
IV. STATUTORY CHALLENGES TO PATIENT REFERRALS AND 
CONFLICTS CREDENTIALING 
Physicians have been largely unsuccessful at challenging the 
rights of hospitals to enter into exclusive contracts or engage in 
other forms of economic credentialing.  Courts and the FTC have 
both concluded that exclusive provider contracts have pro-
competitive effects that often improve the quality of patient care.83  
Further, physicians have had mixed success claiming that the 
imposition of conflicts credentialing was a breach of 
contract/bylaws between the physician and the hospital, especially 
when the credentialing is only used prospectively to exclude 
physicians from existing medical staffs.84 
Recently, medical associations and physician groups have 
begun to challenge conflicts credentialing as violating the federal 
anti-kickback statutes and anti-trust laws.85  In this section, the 
authors discuss applicable statutes that have most recently been 
cited and two current cases where physicians have had some initial 
success at challenging the retroactive imposition of conflicts 
credentialing. 
 
rules and regulations.”). 
 79. See Semo supra note 76. 
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See supra notes 31, 32 and accompanying text. 
 84. See Mahan v. Avera St. Lukes, 2001 SD 9, 621 N.W.2d 150 (2001); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 35-64. 
 85. See Murphy v. Baptist Health, CV 2004-2002 (using anti-kickback laws to 
challenge implementation of conflicts credentialing); Biddulph et. al. v. HCA, Inc. 
& E. Idaho Health Servs., Inc., Case No. CV-04-1219 (using antitrust laws to 
challenge conflicts credentialing). 
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A. Challenging Conflicts Credentialing with the Federal Anti-Kickback 
Statute: Are Staff Privileges “Remuneration”? 
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute86 prohibits the knowing and 
willful offer, solicitation, payment or receipt of any remuneration 
in return for or in order to induce either any referral for items or 
services covered under any federal health care program, or the 
purchase, lease or ordering of such items or services.87  For 
purposes of the Anti-Kickback Statute, a “federal health care 
program” is defined to include a broad range of federally-funded 
health care programs, including Medicare, Medicaid, TRICARE, 
CHAMPUS, the Children’s Health Insurance Program, and 
programs funded by Maternal and Child Health Block Grants or 
Social Services Block Grants.88 
The intent of the Anti-Kickback Statute is to prohibit the direct 
or indirect receipt and payment of remuneration in connection 
with the referral of patients and activities related to the acquisition 
of goods, facilities, services and other items paid for by the federal 
health care program.89 
On December 2, 1999, the AMA requested that the Health and 
Human Services-Office of Inspector General (OIG) publish a fraud 
and abuse alert on the practice of exclusive or conflict 
credentialing.90  In that letter, the AMA asserted that medical staff 
privileges were a form of remuneration and complained that the 
practice of exclusive or conflicts credentialing: 
requires physicians seeking medical staff membership and 
privileges at a specific hospital to agree to admit patients 
exclusively or principally in a specific hospital only if they 
agree to refer all or most of their patients to that hospital.  
Some exclusive credentialing policies go further, 
prohibiting medical staff members from any association 
(investment, employment or contractual) with facilities 
that compete with the hospital, even if the competing 
facility would be the better choice from a quality of care 
 
 86. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2000). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)(1) (2000); Rules and Regulations, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 63518, 63538-39 (Nov. 19, 1999). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). 
 90. Letter from AMA to OIG dated December 2, 1999 (on file with author). 
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perspective.91 
The AMA supplemented this request in a second letter to the OIG 
in September 2002.92 
In response, the OIG issued a request for public comments 
regarding the development of possible guidance addressing certain 
credentialing practices.93  The OIG’s Solicitation of Public 
Comments on Certain Credentialing Practices referred to the 
AMA’s concern that “an increasing number of hospitals are 
refusing to grant staff privileges to physicians who (1) own or have 
other financial interests in, or leadership positions with, competing 
health care entities, (2) refer to competing health care entities, or 
(3) fail to admit some specified percentage of their patients to the 
hospital.”94 
The OIG recognized the historical precedent that the denial 
of a physician’s hospital privileges was “rarely actionable” under the 
Federal Anti-Kickback laws.95  The OIG also noted the increase of 
physician ownership in freestanding facilities, and stated, “[t]hese 
physicians may be in a position to steer profitable business or 
patients to their own competing business through their control of 
referrals.”96 
The OIG reasoned that “a credentialing policy that 
categorically refuses privileges to physicians with significant conflict 
of interest would not appear to implicate that [A]nti-[K]ickback 
[S]tatute in most situations.”97  However, the OIG stated its concern 
that “discretionary decision-making” could raise certain Anti-
Kickback risks. 
Several credentialing practices have been brought to our 
attention that give the privilege-granting hospital 
discretion to evaluate the “financial conflict” created by a 
physician’s outside business interests and permit the 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. See Letter from Michael D. Maves, AMA to Kevin G. McAnaney, Chief, 
OIG (Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/ 
pub/upload/mm/395/ sept_ltr_oig.doc; see also William B. Monnig, Report of the 
Organized Medical Staff Section Governing Council, I-04 REPORT B (AMA, Chicago, IL), 
at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/21/i04rep-b.doc (last 
visited Mar. 3, 2005) (providing a timeline of AMA/OIG communications on 
“economic and exclusive credentialing”). 
 93. Annual Comment Notice, 67 Fed. Reg. 72894 (Dec. 9, 2002). 
 94. Id. at 72895. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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physician to retain privileges subject to periodic review.  
Such discretionary decision-making appears to raise 
substantial risks under the [A]nti-[K]ickback [S]tatute 
(i.e., privileges are conditioned on a sufficient flow of 
referred business).98 
The OIG also noted that some hospitals were conditioning 
privileges on referrals other than the minimum necessary for 
clinical proficiency.99  The OIG concluded that privileges can be 
remuneration and that certain types of credentialing decisions can 
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute: “Certain medical staff 
credentialing practices may implicate the [A]nti-[K]ickback 
[S]tatute.  For example, conditioning privileges on a particular 
number of referrals or requiring the performance of a particular 
number of procedures, beyond volumes necessary to ensure clinical 
proficiency, potentially raise substantial risks under the statute.”100  
Whether privileges were remuneration, and whether a hospital’s 
use of conflicts credentialing could be justified under certain 
circumstances, were therefore important considerations in 
determining whether conflicts credentialing could violate the Anti-
Kickback Statute. 
The AMA and the AHA both provided comments in response 
to the OIG’s solicitation.  The organizations took conflicting 
positions on a number of issues, including whether hospital 
privileges constituted remuneration under the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.  The AHA argued that privileges were remuneration and 
“do not involve the transfer of something of value from a hospital 
to a physician.”101  As the AHA stated in response to the OIG’s 
solicitation for comments: 
In granting privileges . . . a hospital transfers no cash or 
any equivalent in-kind benefit to the physician.  Rather, to 
the extent a physician receives an economic benefit 
related to hospitalized patients, that benefit derives solely 
from the payment made to the physician’s patient or 
his/her insurer for professional services rendered.  There 
is no remuneration, in cash or in kind, from the hospital, 
which neither provides patient referrals nor performs the 
income-generating services.102 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 72896. 
 100. Notices, 69 Fed. Reg. 32012, 32023 (June 8, 2004). 
 101. Letter from Rick Pollack to Janet Rehnquist, supra note 75. 
 102. Id. 
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The AMA reasoned, on the other hand, that privileges were 
remuneration: “Clinical privileges are crucial to physicians.  
Without clinical privileges, physicians cannot admit patients to a 
hospital for treatment.  Most, if not all, physicians cannot practice 
medicine effectively without the ability to admit patients to a 
hospital when necessary or to provide consultation when 
requested.”103 
The Anti-Kickback Statute does not provide a private right of 
action.  The Anti-Kickback Statute provides criminal and civil 
penalties for individuals and entities that violate the statute unless 
the payment and receipt of “remuneration” fits into a safe harbor 
regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services (DHHS).104  Each offense under the 
Anti-Kickback Statute is punishable by a fine of up to $25,000 and 
imprisonment for up to five years.105  Violators are also subject to 
exclusion from the federal health care program upon a 
determination of violation by the DHHS regardless of whether a 
criminal conviction has been obtained.106 
Prior to 1997, the OIG did not have the authority to impose 
civil penalties upon violators and the OIG entered into significant 
monetary settlements with individuals and entities under 
investigation for potential violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute.  
However, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress amended the 
civil monetary provisions to allow DHHS to recover treble damages 
plus $50,000 for each violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.107 
Even though the statute does not provide for a private right of 
action, the Anti-Kickback Statute can be used to challenge conflict 
credentialing policies.  Courts have held that contracts that 
contravene the Ant-Kickback statute violate public policy and are 
therefore unenforceable, “irrespective of whether anyone can be 
prosecuted criminally (or civilly) in connection with that 
agreement.”108  Consistent with the statutory language, courts have 
interpreted the definition of remuneration broadly: “The text 
 
 103. Letter from Michael D. Maves, AMA, to Janet Rehnquist, OIG (Feb. 6, 
2003) (on file with author). 
 104. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000). 
 105. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B). 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6)(i). 
 107. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) (current version). 
 108. Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Serv., Inc., 926 F. 
Supp. 835, 843 (E.D. Ark. 1996); see also Zimmer, Inc., v. Nu Tech Med., Inc., 54 F. 
Supp. 2d 850, 863 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 
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refers to ‘any remuneration.’  That includes not only sums for 
which no actual service was performed but also those amounts for 
which some professional time was expended.  ‘Remunerates’ is 
defined as ‘to pay an equivalent for service.’”109  The Anti-Kickback 
Statute may provide a basis for challenging conflicts credentialing 
in those circumstances in which the courts find that physician 
privileges are a form of remuneration. 
Such a legal theory is being pursued in a case pending before 
the Arkansas Supreme Court.  In Murphy v. Baptist Health,110 
plaintiffs used federal and state anti-kickback laws to challenge the 
unilateral implementation of conflicts credentialing.  Baptist 
Health Medical Center is a general purpose hospital that is part of 
the Baptist Health medical system.  The plaintiff physicians have 
staff privileges at Baptist Health and also shareholders of the Little 
Rock Cardiology Clinic.111  The clinic in turn owned a minority 
ownership interest in the Arkansas Heart Hospital, a competitor of 
Baptist Health.112 
Baptist Health adopted a conflict policy which required 
professional staff members to disclose direct or indirect interests in 
competing hospitals and declared that any physician with such an 
interest was ineligible for initial or renewed appointment.113  The 
credentialing policy further provided that any physician granted 
privileges “who subsequently acquires or holds an ownership 
interest or investment interest in a competing hospital, 
immediately ceases to be qualified to hold appointment or clinical 
privileges at Baptist Health. . . .” 114  In 2004, Baptist Health notified 
the plaintiff physicians that their ownership interest disqualified 
them from staff appointments and privileges and that effective in 
the near future they would not permitted to schedule future 
procedures or appointments at the hospital.115 
The physicians sued, alleging that the Baptist Health policy 
violated the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute,116 by creating a system of 
 
 109. United States v. Bay State Ambulance and Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 
F.2d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing WEBSTER THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
(1966)). 
 110. Murphy v. Baptist Health, No. CV2004-2002, (13th Div. Civ. Ct. Ark. filed 
Feb. 24, 2004). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶ 3, Murphy (No. CV2004-2002). 
 113. Id. ¶ 5. 
 114. Id. ¶ 7. 
 115. Id. ¶ 15. 
 116. Id. ¶ 1.  Plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud 
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rewarding appointments and privileges to physicians in exchange 
for increased referrals to Baptist Health, which “constitutes offering 
and paying prohibited indirect remuneration to physicians in 
exchange for these referrals. . . .”117  The physician plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin implementation of such credentialing as contrary to 
federal law and interfering with their relationships with patients 
and with referring physicians.118 
In response to plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, 
Baptist Hospital relied on Mahan v. Avera St. Lukes’ and argued that 
it was in the best interests of the community for the doctors to not 
be extended staff privileges at Baptist because the loss of loss of 
patients would jeopardize the other non-profit functions of the 
hospital.119  The trial court granted the preliminary injunction, 
holding that the granting of privileges to physicians under the facts 
alleged by plaintiffs did appear to be a violation of the federal anti-
kick back laws and other statutes cited by the plaintiffs.120  The case 
is currently on appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court. 
B. Challenging Conflicts Credentialing Through Anti-Trust Law 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act121 provide an additional 
basis for challenging conflicts credentialing policies.  Significant 
legal and factual hurdles exist, however, with respect to the 
application of either section of the Sherman Act. 
To prevail under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff 
must establish the existence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade.  
This requires the existence of multiple parties capable of entering 
into a conspiracy.122  Whether a hospital and its staff are distinct 
entities capable of conspiring varies among jurisdictions.123  Some 
jurisdictions view the medical staff itself as a group of distinct 
 
Act, the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud False Claims Act, the Arkansas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act and two common law theories.  Id. 
 117. Id. ¶ 29. 
 118. Id. ¶¶ 31-32, 54-55. 
 119. Murphy v. Baptist Health, CV 2004-2002, (13th Div. Civ. Ct. Ark. Mar. 22, 
2004) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
 120. Id. 
 121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1- 2 (2000). 
 122. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-72 
(1984). 
 123. Compare Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 814-17 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding 
hospital and staff were one entity and as a matter of law could not conspire with 
each other), with Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819 (11th Cir. 
1990) (finding hospital and its staff were separate entities capable of conspiring). 
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individuals capable of conspiring among themselves.124 
To bring a section 2 Sherman Act claim, the plaintiff claiming 
monopolization or attempted monopolization must be a 
competitor of the hospital or consumer of the hospital’s services to 
have standing to bring the claim.125  Additionally, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the hospital possessed the intent to 
monopolize.126  The failure to prevail on one section of the 
Sherman Act is not determinative of the ability to prevail on the 
other. 
The use of the Sherman Act to challenge conflicts 
credentialing is illustrated in the matter of Biddulph/Mountain View 
Hospital v. HCA/Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center, 127 currently 
pending in the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District in 
Idaho.  In that case, the Trustees of an Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center (EIRMC), a community hospital located in Idaho 
Falls, unilaterally adopted a Medical Staff Development Plan 
(MSDP) that purported to “supplement” the medical staff bylaws.128  
The MSDP required physicians to disclose financial relationships or 
investment in competing facilities and empowered the board to 
remove a “practitioner’s appointment and clinical privileges . . . if 
the [Trustees determine] by objective criteria that a practitioner is 
diverting patients to other facilities. . . for reasons related to that 
practitioner’s financial or other gain.”129 
In 2003, without prior notice, the board voted to terminate five 
physicians with staff privileges at EIRMC who were also substantial 
investors in Mountain View Hospital (Mountain View), a twenty-
bed-surgical-andobstetric hospital established by several local 
physicians.130  In response, Mountain View and four of the five 
allegedly conflicted physicians filed an eight-count complaint in 
state court, alleging breach of contract, tortuous interference with 
 
 124. Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 612-13 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 125. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); see, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 
F.2d 98, 104 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding party could not maintain action against 
alleged monopolist because party was neither provider nor consumer of offered 
services). 
 126. See White, 820 F.2d at 104 (holding that one of the elements of Section 2 is 
a “willful acquisition” of monopoly power). 
 127. Biddulph v. HCA, Inc., No. CV-04-1219 (D. Idaho filed Aug, 6, 2004). 
 128. Id. at 10. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.; see IDAHO CODE § 48-104 (2004) (“A contract, combination, or 
conspiracy between two or more persons in unreasonable restrain of Idaho 
commerce is unlawful.”). 
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prospective economic advantage, and two counts under the Idaho 
Competition Act (conspiracy to adopt anti-competitive policies131 
and attempted monopolization).132  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
MSDP was an anti-competitive policy targeting new hospitals in the 
Idaho Falls area.133 
Reasoning that the Idaho Competition Act134 was substantially 
similar to the Federal Sherman Act, the trial court looked to 
federal law to determine whether the plaintiffs could state a claim 
for conspiracy or attempted monopolization.135  The trial court 
dismissed the section 1 conspiracy claim, reasoning that the board 
could not conspire with itself.136  The trial court, however, refused 
to dismiss the section 2 monopolization claim.137 
In the Sherman Act section 2 claim, the plaintiffs’ alleged that 
the MSDP was an anti-competitive policy targeting new hospitals in 
the Idaho Falls area.138  EIRMC argued that it could refuse to deal 
with competitors as a matter of law.139  Plaintiffs’ asserted that a 
refusal to deal violated section 2 if the actor was a conceded 
monopolist.140  The court, in denying the motion to dismiss, 
reasoned that the plaintiffs had alleged facts raising an issue as to 
whether EIRMC had monopoly power in the Idaho Falls market 
and whether EIRMC was willfully using such power in adopting and 
 
 131. Id.; see IDAHO CODE §48-105 (2004) (“It is unlawful to monopolize, attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire to monopolize any line of Idaho 
commerce.”). 
 132. Biddulph, CV-04-1219, at 27. 
 133. Id. 
 134. IDAHO CODE § 48-104 (2004). 
 135. See id. § 48-102(3) (directing court to utilize the interpretation of federal 
statutes in interpreting comparable Idaho statutes in the absence of reported 
Idaho appellate decisions). Here, the court looked to federal case law from the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  Biddulph, CV-04-1219, at 23-24. 
 136. In so reasoning, the trial court looked to whether one of the decision 
makers sat on the board or was a member of the medical staff.  Biddulph, CV-04-
1219, at 25-27.  Although many circuits have held that a hospital cannot conspire 
with its medical staff, other courts have held that medical staff members could 
conspire with the hospital because medical staff members are generally not 
officers or directors of the hospital.  Compare Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 
814-17 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding medical staff could conspire with hospital), with 
Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding 
medical staff could not conspire with hospital).  Whether the medical staff can 
conspire with the hospital therefore depends on whether the members are 
considered officers or directors of the hospital. 
 137. Biddulph, CV-04-1219, at 31-32. 
 138. Id. at 27. 
 139. Id. at 28. 
 140. Id. at 28-29. 
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implementing the MSDP in 2002 through 2004.141  The case has 
been set for trial and the parties are engaged in discovery.142 
V. CONCLUSION 
Continued reductions in the Medicare-physician-fee schedule 
and payment for health care will increase competition for health 
care dollars.  Reduced reimbursement and increased competition 
for patients will also continue to create tension between hospitals 
and their medical staff.  Physicians will position themselves as 
competitors to hospitals as they seek to increase their revenues 
through ownership in freestanding facilities and joint ventures with 
hospitals.  In some markets, hospitals will have no choice but to 
allow physicians to compete against them because utilizing a 
conflict of interest credentialing policy would drive physicians to 
competing hospitals.  In other markets, hospitals will succeed in 
using conflict of interest credentialing policies as a method of 
improving the hospital’s strategic position and preserving its 
economic viability. 
Conflicts and other forms of economic credentialing will only 
increase as community and other general hospitals compete with 
freestanding healthcare facilities.  Although hospitals have the 
power to implement economic credentialing in certain 
circumstances, the manner and method of how this is done 
depends on a number of factors, including the terms of the 
corporate bylaws, state statutes, and whether the credentialing is 
done prospectively or is meant as a mechanism to retroactively 
remove or punish alleged competing physicians.  The law in this 
area is far from settled and it will continue to evolve as physicians 
and hospitals deliver patient care in a highly regulated 
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